

PSYCHE AND DAIMON IN THE FRAGMENTS OF HERACLITUS

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φασὶ δὲ Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τὸ Ἡρακλείτου σύγγραμμα
ἐρέσθαι, "τί δοκεῖ;" τὸν δὲ φάναι, "ἅ μὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα·
οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἅ μὴ συνῆκα· πλήν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται
κολυμβητοῦ."

– Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum*,
(Concerning Socrates), II. 22

Many scholars in the fields of both philosophy and classics have done valuable work analyzing the views of the Ephesian philosopher Heraclitus concerning the metaphysical side of human nature. Such an effort demands the consideration of many different factors. Among these are 1.) The proper definition of Heraclitus' terms, 2.) A balanced consideration of his conceptual antecedents, and 3.) A sound harmony of extant fragments on the subject. In this study we will seek to take each of these factors into account as we explore a few of the positions taken by scholars, considering the strengths and weaknesses of the conclusions they have drawn. We will identify some parameters that can be established by harmonizing elements of relevant fragments, in order to determine what we can know about Heraclitus' concepts.

There are two words that we will consider which Heraclitus uses that are relevant to the topic: *psyche* (ψυχή) and *daimon* (δαίμων). It is important that each of these words be clearly defined in both meaning and historical context if we are to accurately understand Heraclitus' views.

I. *PSYCHE* (ψυχή).

A. Etymology.

It is unfortunate that more is not known about the background of the word *psyche* (ψυχή). While there are no similar words present in Mycenaean Linear B, it is related to the Vedic Sanskrit word *ápsu* (अप्सु) (Chantraine, Vol. 5, p. 1295) meaning - "without food, having no breath" (Kanta, p. 66).¹ In fact almost all words used for the *soul* or *spirit* in ancient languages were associated

¹ Chantraine connects *ápsu* (अप्सु) and *bhastrâ* (भस्त्रा) "a bellows" (Benfey, p. 646) with *psyche*. (Vol. V, p. 1295). There may also be some relationship between the word *sûka* (सूक) meaning "1. an arrow, 2. air, wind" (Benfey, p. 1051) and *psyche*. Although it should be noted that linguistically Indo-European *bhs-/ps-* were generally preserved in both Greek and Sanskrit as *ps-* rather than simply *s-* (Misra, p. 43).

with “wind” or “breath.”² This is evident in Greek also in the word *pneuma* (πνεῦμα) defined “I. blast, wind, II. breathed air, breath, III. divine inspiration, IV. spirit” (LSJ. p. 1424).

B. Pre-Heraclitean Definition.

Psyche (ψυχή) poses a bit of a challenge, given the fact that there is evidence that its meaning has expanded over time. Kevin Robb in his July 1986 article entitled “*Psyche* and *Logos* in the Fragments of Heraclitus: The Origins of the Concept of Soul,” points out this challenge:

In terms of Heraclitean usage, *psyche* especially must be clearly and precisely demarcated from the Homeric past; but at the same time, the philosopher must not, prematurely, be advanced into the Socratic and Platonic future. (p. 316).

It is well established that, from the use of *psyche* (ψυχή) in Homer, meaning “I. life, II. departed spirit, ghost, ” to the Platonic usages as “III. the immaterial and immortal soul, IV. the conscious self or personality as the centre of emotions, desires and affections,” there has been a clear evolution. (LSJ, pp. 2026-7). Robb suggests that Heraclitus makes “a radical break from popular and Homeric belief” (p. 315). This break will be evident in the fact that the Homeric *psyche* is “that condition which it is man’s fate to become at death” and thus “no god has or is a *psyche* in Homer” (ibid. p. 318). This is a valuable distinction which must be kept in mind. The Homeric presentation of man’s *psyche* as the sum of his personality after death, in contrast to its inactivity before death

² This same tendency is repeated in many languages. Among the **INDO-EUROPEAN** languages: **Hittite** made use of the Summerian ideogram ZI- (𒀭𒀫) meaning “breath, heart, soul; wish, desire, self” modified by Hittite phonetic endings (Sturtevant, p. 188). **Latin** had the words *anima* meaning - “I. Lit. A. Wind, B. 1. the air as an element... 2 breath, II. Transf., A, the vital principle, the soul...” (Marchant, p. 40) and *animus* “1. The mind as opposed to the body, 2. substituted for the person, 3. the element of the air (as the principle of life), 4. the mind as the seat of consciousness. - cf. Oscan *ananúm*, Greek *anemos* (ἄνεμος), Sanskrit *aniti*” (OLD, p. 134). The **Greek** word ἄνεμος meaning simply “wind” of either the body or the air (LSJ, p. 132) has an antecedent in the **Mycenaean** Linear B word *a-ne-mo* (𐀀𐀃𐀆𐀇) also meaning “wind” (Ventris & Chadwick, p. 387). In **Sanskrit** *anila* (अनिल) can mean “1. Wind, 2. The deity of the wind ... 3. Wind as one of the humors of the body” (Benfey, p. 20). A similar word, *atman* (आत्मन्) means “1. breath, 2. soul...” (Benfey, p. 74).

Among **SEMETIC** languages the same tendency existed: The **Ugaritic** word *rh* (𐎗𐎐) meant “wind, spirit” (Segert, p. 201). The **Phoenician** word *rh* (𐤓𐤇) meant the same: “spirit, wind” (Harris, p. 145). The **Biblical Hebrew** word *ruach* (רוּחַ) means “breath, wind, air, breeze, blowing; animal life, spirit, ghost, soul, mind, intellect, passion” (Feyerabend, p. 314).

differs significantly from the later use of the word. Citing the *Iliad*, Martha Nussbaum observes:

A hero may fight for *psyche* (22.161) or risk his *psyche* in battle (9.321) or discourse about the irrecoverability of the *psyche* once it is lost (9.408). But he is never aware of doing any thing by means of it in life... (as quoted by Schofield, p. 22).

While these distinctions are profound, we must avoid overstating the differences. To make his case Robb speaks of the existence of the Homeric *psyche* in Hades as “bereft of mind or speech or pleasures (as Homer specifies)” (p. 319). To support this claim he cites *Odyssey* 11.94. Odysseus has gone to the entrance of Hades, dug a trench and poured blood in it to lure the spirits of the dead into his presence:

ῥῶν ἦλθε δῶ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ Θηβαίου Τειρεσίαο
 χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχων, ἐμὲ δῶ ἔγνω καὶ προσέειπεν·
 ῥῶδιογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχανῶ Ὀδυσσεῦ,
 τίπτῶ αὐτῶ, ὧ δύστηνε, λιπῶν φάος ἡελίοιο
 ἦλυθες, ὄφρα ἴδῃ νέκυας καὶ ἀτερπέα χῶρον; (11.90-94).

And the soul of the Theban Teiresias came up, having a golden staff, and he knew me and spoke to me:
 ‘Son of Laertes, Zeus born, Odysseus of many devices, how does it happen, O unhappy man, that you come here, having left the light of the sun, in order to see the dead and (this) unpleasant land?’

Certainly Teiresias describes this as a place *aterpea* (ἀτερπέα) - “unpleasing, joyless” (LSJ, p. 269), but Teiresias has both mind and voice. This is true of Achilles later on in the book as Homer claims his *psyche* “knew” (ἔγνω) Odysseus and “spoke” (προσηύδα) to him (11. 471-472). Homeric scholar, Dr. Stanley Lombardo has observed that while it is true that the souls of the dead in book eleven cannot speak, or recognize Odysseus until they drink the blood (11.150-154), a “contradiction to this is found in book twenty-four” where the departed souls of the suitors converse with Achilles, Agamemnon, and Patrocles (April 26, 1999 Pre-Socratics Seminar). While it is accurate to identify the pre-Heraclitean *psyche* with death rather than cognitive activity in life, we must not rob the archaic usage of its full range of meaning.

In addition to the Homeric use of the word *psyche* let us consider another pre-Heraclitean witness to its application. Thales, a predecessor of Heraclitus from Miletus seems to have accepted a type of animistic view of the world. He held that the soul was a sort of mover. According to Aristotle he believed that the magnet had a soul (Aristotle, *de Anima*, 405a 19) and that all things

were full of gods (ibid., 411a 7).³

II. *DAIMON* (δαίμων).

A. Etymology.

Daimon (δαίμων) is defined: “I. *Divine power, the deity*, II. *souls of men of the golden age*, acting as tutelary deities, 1. later of *departed souls, ghosts*, 2. generally *spiritual, semi-divine being* inferior to the gods, esp. *evil spirit, demon*” (LSJ, pp. 365-6). There is a bit more that can be deduced about the etymology of the word *daimon* than *psyche*. While there is no common word in Linear B or Sanskrit it is equivalent to the Latin *Di Manes* (LSJ, p. 366), *manes* meaning “1.a. *the spirits of the dead* regarded as minor supernatural powers...” (OLD, p. 1072). The Latin word *Manes* is believed to be derived from the Phrygian word *man* (𐌆𐌆𐌆) meaning “*departed soul*” (Walde, p. 27).⁴ It seems likely that there is also a connection between *daimon* and the Old Persian word *daiva* (𐎠𐎡𐎴𐎠𐎹) meaning “*false deity, idol, demon*” (Brandenstein, p. 114).⁵ This is interesting in light of the fact that Ephesus, Heraclitus’ native city was under Persian rule during all of his life.

B. Pre-Heraclitean Definition.

W. K. C. Guthrie, in his monumental work *A History of Greek Philosophy* observes the fact that “...from the time of Hesiod at least, the immortal spirits of good men were also *daimones*...” (Vol. I. p. 482). This conclusion is drawn from Hesiod’s description of the dead of the “Golden Age” in *Works and Days*:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γένος κατὰ γαῖᾳ ἐκάλυψε, τοὶ
 μὲν δαίμονες ἄγνοιο ἐπιχθόνιοι καλέονται
 ἐσθλοῖ, ἀλεξίκακοι, φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων,
 [οἷ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα
 ἡέρα ἐσσάμενοι πάντη φοιτῶντες ἐπὶ αἴαν.]
 πλουτοδότηι

³ ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν | τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, | ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ (405a 19). καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δὴ τινες αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι | φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾤθηται πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. (411a 7).

⁴ *Manes* is also represented in the Etruscan word *mani* (𐌆𐌆𐌆) meaning “*the dead*” (Bonafante, p. 144).

⁵ In Hittite *da-a-i-* (𐎠𐎡𐎴𐎠𐎹) means “*place, put, bury*” (Sturtevant, p. 146) which leads us to wonder if the root concept of these words was not originally some reference to “*those buried*.” This is of course pure speculation.

But since the earth, indeed covered this race, – they are called pure, and noble earth-dwelling daimons, keeping off evil, guardians of mortal men, givers of riches. These very ones watch the judgements and savage deeds, roaming over all the earth, clothed in the thick air.. (121-125).

While it is true that Hesiod limits those who become *daimons* to only those of the Golden Age, this does serve as an example of equating *psyche* and *daimon*.

Along with Thales the Ionic Philosopher Pythagoras took an animistic view the world. He claimed that the ringing of struck bronze was “...the voice of some one of the *daimons* imprisoned in the bronze” (...φωνήν εἰωαί τινος τῶν δαιμόνων ἐναπειλημμένην τῷ χαλκῷ. - Porphorius, *Life of Pythagoras*, 41). Diogenes Laertius claimed that Heraclitus believed in a similar type of animism, claiming “all things are full of souls and daimons” (πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη - *Vitae Philosophorum*, IX, 2).

III. The Fragments.

Thomas Robinson in his 1986 article entitled “Heraclitus on Soul” identified seven primary fragments, and two secondary fragments that “quickly set out” (in his words) “what Heraclitus said about the soul” (p. 305). We will use his arrangement of the fragments as an outline of our own study, adding fr.119, combining fr. 117 & 118 and fr. 98 & 27, and disregarding fr. 77 and 85 for the purposes of this study.

A. Fragment 45.

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἄν ἐξεύροιο, πᾶσαν
ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

You would not find the soul’s boundaries that exist, going over every road; it has such a deep *logos*.

(Diogenes Laertius IX, 7).

For Heraclitus the *psyche* (ψυχή) has a *logos* (λόγος). In fr. 114 he claimed - “all human laws are fed by one divine” (τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ). Joel Wilcox in his 1991 article entitled “Barbarian *Psyche* in Heraclitus” commenting upon fr. 114 suggests that it shows that Heraclitus’ “*logos* is the same as the divine law” which he claims “counts as a divinity in Heraclitus’ highly original pantheon.” (p. 629). Sextus Empiricus in commenting on Heraclitus’ statement in fr. 1 “with all things coming about according to this *logos*...” (γινομένων

γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε) claimed that it established that “everything we do or think depends upon participation in the divine account [μετοχὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου]” (*Against the Mathematicians*, VII, 133, trans. Barnes, p. 101). This seems to concur with Wilcox’s assessment that the *logos* is a type of inner divinity, or (as Heidegger calls it) “something like an absent presence” (Frings, p. 75). Many cultures have held that man’s spirit or soul is “divine breath” within mortal bodies.⁶ Yet for Heraclitus while the *psyche* and the *logos* are not the same, it is the *psyche* which allows the divine law of *logos* to operate in the human being.⁷

B. Fragment 36.

ψυχῆισιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέ-
σθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι, ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ
γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχῆ.

For souls to become water [is] death, but for water to become earth [is] death, yet from earth comes water, and from water [comes] the soul.

(Clement *Strom.* VI, 17, 2)

Malcolm Schofield, joint editor of the second edition of Kirk & Raven’s The Presocratic Philosophers, in a 1991 piece entitled “Heraclitus Theory of Soul and Its Antecedents” comments on

⁶ The concept that the human soul is divine breath is a common theme in religious literature. In the *Rig Veda*, dated conservatively to 700-800 B.C. it is declared - आत्म देवानां भुवनस्य गर्भे - *atma devanam bhúvanasya gárbho* - “breath of the gods, germ of life.” (MacDonell, p. 218). The Hebrew Bible declares – אֶת־הָאָדָם עָפָר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּנְשָׁם יְהוָה אֶל־נֹסְרָתוֹ וַיֵּשֶׁב בְּאֶפְרוֹתָיו נְשַׁמַּת חַיִּים וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה׃ וַיִּצַּר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים – “And the LORD God formed man [of] the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being.” (Genesis 2:7, NKJV). The Hebrew word *nepheš* (נֶפֶשׁ) used in this text means “breath, respiration, life: soul, spirit, mind; living being, creature, a person, self” (Feyerabend, p. 220). Within the SEMETIC language group this is a common word. In Akkadian the word *napištu* (𒍪𒍪𒍪 ideogram) meant “throat; soul; life” (Ungand, p. 189). In Ugaritic *npš* (𐎎𐎍𐎑𐎒) was defined “lung, throat > breath, soul, person” (Segert, p. 194). The Phoenician: *npš* (𐤎𐤐𐤑) meant simply “soul” (Harris, p. 125).

There is a striking similarity between this word-group and a similar group of words found in some INDO-EUROPEAN languages. In Hittite the word *ne-pí-iš* (𐎎𐎍𐎑𐎒) meant “heaven” (Held, p. 158). This same word came into Sanskrit as the word *nebhas* (नभस) defined “1. Sky, atmosphere... 2. du. Heaven and earth... 3. Aether as one of the five elements...” (Benfey, p. 457); Into Greek as *nephos* (νέφος) meaning “cloud, mass of clouds, metaph. cloud of death” (LS, p. 462); and into Latin as the word *nebula* - “exhalation, fog, mist, 2. poet. cloud” (Marchant, p. 360). It is very tempting to imagine some prehistoric connection with the Semetic *npš*.

⁷ Wilcox might differ with this conclusion. He sees what he calls a “material likeness between *psyche* and *logos*. (p. 633).

fragment 36 and its relationship with fragment 31 (which describes the cycle of cosmic transformations from sea to earth to fire and back). Schofield writes:

...soul [in fr. 36] is allotted the place in the cycle of elemental transformations which is assigned to fire in the cosmic cycle of fr. 31: as fire turns to sea which turns into earth, so soul becomes water which becomes earth. (p. 19).

G. S. Kirk made the same assertion in his 1949 article entitled “Heraclitus and Death in Battle” (p. 387). If this correlation is sound then it suggests to us 1.) that Heraclitus considered the soul to be a type of fire, and 2.) it is death for the soul to become water. We should note that Heraclitus does not equate physical death with becoming water but death for the soul. Instead many argue that the ideal death, in Heraclitus’ concept is a “posthumous reunion of pure fiery souls with fire in the celestial regions” (Schofield, p. 17). Guthrie suggests:

It would be keeping with all the habits of early Greek thought that such a soul at the death of the body be assimilated to that *Logos*, becoming pure fire, and escape from the cosmic cycle of becoming... (Guthrie, p. 481).

Wilcox holds that understanding the *logos* which Heraclitus advocates in fr. 1 is not distinct from “becoming fiery.” (p. 633). If this is true, being in touch with the divine-*logos* would have the twofold effect of benefiting one’s life before and after death. Addressing primarily fr. 24 which praises death in battle, Kirk shows the distinction between soul-death by water and physical death:

Some retain their fiery character and rejoin the mass of pure fire in the world; and since dryness, i.e. greater fieriness, was in life held to be the condition of wisdom and excellence, it follows that those souls which remain fiery and do not undergo the death of becoming water are the souls of the virtuous, and that the association with pure fire is the afterlife which Heraclitus seems to promise... (Kirk, p. 389).

Some understand fr. 36 to refer to very naturalistic concepts, apart from metaphysical concerns. Miroslav Marcovich holds that fr. 36 refers “to the *normal* constant and regulated physiological processes *within* the living human organism, and not to the destiny of soul after the physiological death.” (as quoted by Schofield, p. 15). If this view is correct, Schofield suggests it indicates “since man is part of the natural world, his soul will be subject to the same physical laws embodying the universal *logos*...” (p. 20). The danger that must be avoided in taking this view is

what Robb warned of in the beginning of our study, attributing to Heraclitus precise cosmological classifications that belong to a later period.

C. Fragments 117 and 118.

Fragment 117:

άνηρ όκόταν μεθυσθῆι, ἄγεται ὑπό παιδός
 άνήβου σφαλλόμενος, οὐκ έπαίωv όκη βαίνει, ὕγρηv
 τήv ψυχήv ἔχων.

A man when he is drunk, is led stumbling by a boy not
 yet mature, not knowing where he is going, having a wet soul.

(Stobaeus *Anth.* III, 5, 7)

Fragment 118:

αὕτη ψυχή σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.

A dry soul is wisest and best

(Stobaeus, *Anth.* III, 5, 8).

We have already seen that the *psyche* for Heraclitus was a form of fire. In this text we see that man can have what Heraclitus calls a “wet soul.” This is not the soul-death of becoming water (as in fr. 36) but it is perhaps the beginnings of it. Guthrie writes:

When warm and dry the soul is at its most intelligent and vital. The encroachment of moisture brings a dimming of the flame of life... (Guthrie, p. 462).

This fact leads Heraclitus to advocate temperance and abstinence from drunkenness. Edward Hussy in his 1991 article entitled “Heraclitus on Living and Dying” suggests “obviously Heraclitus more than disapproves of drunkenness. To him it is a case of the dying of the soul.” (p. 524). This may stem from a metaphysical view of the *psyche* or (again) a naturalistic perspective. Schofield commenting on fr. 117 writes:

...the simultaneous loss of physical and mental control exhibited by the drunkard not only confirms that the soul is a material entity but also indicates that it is weakened – and could no doubt be destroyed – by wet substances. (p. 20).

D. Fragment 107.

κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν
 ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὠτα βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἔχόντων

The eyes and ears of those having
 barbarous souls are bad witnesses to men.

(Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* VII 126)

Charles Kahn sees this text as a milestone in the use of the word *psyche* claiming that it is “the first time in extant literature that the word *psyche* ‘soul’ is used for the power of rational thought. (Robb, p. 328). This is quite significant in light of the changes in meaning which this word has undergone. In spite of his criticism of these *barbarous psychai* (βαρβάρους ψυχᾶς) Heraclitus claims they have “eyes” (ὄφθαλμοί) and “ears” (ὠτα).

There are two basic interpretations of this fragment. Bearing in mind that the Greeks considered any who could not understand Greek to be *barbarous*, the first view takes *barbarous* to refer to those who fail to understand language. The language, in question would most likely be the language of the senses that allows one to understand the *logos*. Kirk, Raven & Schofield suggest that “barbarian souls” are “those that cannot understand the language of, cannot correctly interpret, the senses, but are misled by superficial appearances.” (p. 188). It is interesting to note that in fr. 114, which describes the *logos* as common to all there is a play on words that communicates an idea similar to this interpretation of fr. 107. The text suggests that those “with sense” (ἐὺν νόῳ) will recognize that the *logos* is “common” (ἐσυνῶ) (Wilcox, p. 629).

A second interpretation of fr. 107 addresses the political situation of Heraclitus’ times. Robb draws a connection between it and the Persian rule of Ephesus which lasted during all of Heraclitus’ life. Persian law required that a Persian religious official be present at every religious sacrifice of any kind. According to Herodotus I.136 during these functions the official chanted “some kind of theogony.” (p. 333-4).⁸ It is difficult to see what bearing this would then have upon Heraclitus’ concepts as a whole. If correct it reduces fr. 107 to little more than a racial insult.

E. Fragments 98 and 27.

Fragment 98:

αἱ ψυχᾶι ὀσμῶνται καθῶ “Αἶδην.

The souls in hades smell.

(Plutarch, *On the Face in the Moon*, 943e).

⁸ διαθέντος δὲ αὐτοῦ Μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεστεῶς ἐπαεῖδει θεογονίην, οἶην δὴ ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσι εἶναι τὴν ἐπαιοιδίην· ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ Μάγου οὐ σφί νόμος ἐστὶ θυσίας ποιέεσθαι. (Herodotus 1.132.3)

Fragment 27:

ἄνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας
ἄσσα οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν.

Some things [which] they neither hope [for] nor consider remain for men having died.

(Clement, *Strom.* IV, 22, 141.1-2).

Both of these fragments greatly stir the interest because both refer to things after death. If we could conclusively determine their meaning we could determine Heraclitus' understanding of the afterlife. In spite of what we shall identify later as some evident principles both fragments reveal, nonetheless both pose a number of problems.

In fr. 98, the first dilemma concerns the purpose of the statement. Some suggest that Heraclitus is addressing the nature of life after death, others argue that he is actually mocking traditional and Homeric belief. Schofield suggests that it may be “specifically designed to mock the Homeric conception of *psyche*” (p. 25). Expanding upon this Kirk writes:

In speaking of “Hades” Heraclitus is making a concession to the established phraseology of Homeric religion, and it is conceivable that the intention of the whole fragment is simply to recapitulate the ancient view that the ψυχή is breath... (Kirk, p. 387).

We have already observed the association of the soul with wind and breath in the ancient world, yet it seems difficult to accept this as the motive behind fr. 98. Smelling and breathing are clearly not the same thing. If the text instead addresses the nature of life after death, interpretation is no less elusive. Some suggest that it implies that in Hades the senses are limited (e.g. Robb above), while others see it as a declaration that souls have sensation. Robinson suggests:

...Heraclitus does not say that souls have only the sense of smell in Hades (as many commentators seem to assume); his meaning could just as well be that souls in Hades retain the sense of smell (as well as the use of senses such as, e.g. sight). (p. 310).

If this is correct fr. 98 becomes a powerful statement about the condition of the soul in death.

Although it sheds the mortal body it maintains sensation.

Not all accept that Heraclitus is advocating (or promising as Kirk claimed above) an after-life. Martha Nussbaum concludes that Heraclitus' theory of the *psyche* recognizes “death as necessary and denies posthumous survival.” (as quoted by Schofield, p. 15). For Kirk the issue is not

existence but individuality. Kirk suggests:

...for Heraclitus...non-individual survival as fire is preferable to survival as water, quite apart from the consideration that the world-mass of fire (of which souls are a part) may be thought of as percipient and intelligent, which water certainly is not. (Kirk, p. 390).

Kirk even suggests that Heraclitus' emphasis upon the fiery soul indicates that Hades itself is this world mass of fire.

When one recalls that the soul in life was by implication characterized as a form of fire, it is not difficult to deduce that Heraclitus' "Hades" is a realm of fire, in which disembodied souls are themselves fiery. (Kirk, p. 389).

Regardless of the conditions or individuality of Heraclitus' view fr. 27 makes it clear that something awaits the soul after death. Jonathan Barnes translates fr. 28 "There await men when they die things they neither expect nor even think of." While this is certainly an accurate translation, there is an ominous side that could be considered in Heraclitus' words. There are two verbs that sway the entire direction of the fragment: *menei* (μένει) and *elpontai* (ἐλπονται). If we translated *menei* "there remains" and *elpontai* "they hope" the entire mood changes. Suddenly Heraclitus is not speaking of the ambiguous unknown, but we are warned about the remnants of life that will consist of things humans do not hope for. In contrast to a more traditional view of death, such as can be seen in Herodotus, where...

οὕτω ὁ μὲν θάνατος μοχθηρῆς ἐούσης τῆς ζῆς
καταφυγὴ αἰρετωτάτη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονε

Thus death is for men the most desirable refuge
from the present distress of the living.

(Herodotus. 7.46.4)

Heraclitus' reunion with universal fire (as Kirk described it above) might seem to some far from the "most desirable refuge."

F. Fragment 119.

ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.

"Character is for man a daimon"
or "A man's character is his daimon" (Stobaeus *Anth.* IV, 40.23).

There are at least two ways that this fragment may be understood depending upon how *ethos* (ἦθος) is defined. The definition of *ethos* is "accustomed place, II. custom, usage... disposi-

tion, character... moral character... pl. traits, characteristics...” (LSJ, p. 766). Heraclitus could be using *ethos* to refer to moral character and practice, or the intrinsic nature of the *psyche*. Robb observes that...

...in epic seldom (if ever) is significant action initiated by any person unless an external supernatural power, a deity, directly affects one of the organs of consciousness. (p. 339).

In this case fr. 119 may reflect Heraclitus’ belief in animism. If so we would find not only a “radical” redefinition of *psyche* (see Robb, above) but also of *daimon*. That is, unlike Hesiod, who only considered the heroes of the “Golden Age” to be *daimons*, Heraclitus might be suggesting that man is simply a *daimon* housed in a mortal body. In fragment 62, which Charles Kahn calls “Heraclitus’ masterpiece” (as quoted by Schofield, p. 32), Heraclitus affirms that there is an immortal side of mortal nature.

ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι,
ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες.

Immortals, mortals, mortals, immortals, the one living the death of these,
the other having died the life of those.

(Hippolytus, *Ref. IX*, 10.6).

Whatever else we might deduce from this statement it makes it clear that Heraclitus believed that man had some aspect of their nature that was immortal.

If instead *ethos* refers to one’s practice, the meaning would differ significantly. Robb suggests that Heraclitus may be taking a very naturalistic approach in this text stating in essence that For the enlightened, their character determines their fate... For *anthropos*, his social habit (perhaps the best attested meaning of *ethos* in Ionic prose, as in Herodotus) is still his *daimon*: that is, cultural habituation totally controls him and manipulates him. (Robb, p. 340).

Unfortunately Heraclitus has much less to say about the subject of the *daimon* than he does about the *psyche*. The only additional uses of *daimon* are fr. 79 and fr. 128 where both are used in reference to the gods. As result it is difficult to isolate the exact meaning. Guthrie blends the two meanings into one in suggesting that...

It links up with the belief in transmigration and means: ‘A man’s character is the immortal and potentially divine part of him.’ This lays a tremendous emphasis on human responsibility and adds to the ethical content of the sentence. (Guthrie, p. 482).

IV. Conclusion.

In our study thus far: 1.) We have considered the pivotal issues that concern the definition of the words *psyche* and *daimon*, 2.) We have presented the scholarly issues and interpretation of a few of the primary fragments pertinent to our topic. What remains is for us to tie these loose strands of analysis into some type of coherent picture of what Heraclitus taught and believed about the metaphysical side of human nature.

First, it is clear that Heraclitus believed in a *psyche* that was composed of some type of fire (fr. 31 & 36). This *psyche* was not extinguished upon the death of the body but received things un hoped for (fr. 27). The *psyche* had vision, hearing, and felt sensation (fr. 107). It could die by becoming watery (fr. 36) and began to die through drunkenness (fr. 117). Last, Heraclitus believed in a form of animism (Aristotle & Diogenes Laertius). The *daimon* in Heraclitus' view was either a synonym for *psyche*, or the name for those who attained distinction in life (fr. 119).

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